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MINORITY RIGHTS AND ETHNIC 
CONFLICT IN ASSAM, INDIA 
ROBERT C. GoSSELINK* 
How will this nationality, the Assamese, be able to keep its numeri-
cal position as the majority in Assam in the face of uncontrolled 
and unassimilated immigration. . . . In the absence of any ar-
rangement in the form of assimilation of immigrants into its 
linguistic fold or of a constitutional provision for maintaining its 
majority position, a weak nationality in the face of a ceaseless 
influx of people belonging to a strong linguistic nation may face 
another eventuality. 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
From both a utopian ideal and a political necessity, India always 
has been committed to unity through diversity. Despite being a nation 
of people speaking twenty-four major languages, practicing a half 
dozen religions, and belonging to widely different ethnic groupings, 
India has maintained its coherence since gaining independence from 
Britain in 1947. Yet cultural differences, communal separatism, and 
competition among ethnic groups for jobs, social status, and political 
power nonetheless have resulted in bitter and violent struggles. In 
Assam,2 these conflicts are compounded by immigration problems and 
demographic changes, which have pitted indigenous Assamese against 
migrant Bengalis, Hindus against Muslims, and Assam against India's 
central government. In 1983, this ethnic tension erupted into violence 
that led to the deaths of over seven thousand persons in less than a 
fortnight.3 Despite attempts to resolve the controversies, religious, lin-
guistic, and cultural tensions in Assam remain high today. Unless steps 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
1 MYRON WEINER, THE SONS OF THE SOIL 113 (1978), quoted in BHABEN BARUA, LANGUAGE 
AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN NORTHEAST INDIA 4 (1971) [hereinafter SONS OF THE SOIL). 
2 Assam is one of the easternmost states of India, occupying a triangular region of 30,408 
square miles. Assam is bordered on the northwest by the kingdom of Bhutan; on the northeast, 
east, and southeast by the small mountain states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, 
Mizoram, Tripura, and Meghalaya; and on the west by Bangladesh. A narrow 40-mile corridor 
running through the foothills of the Himalayas in West Bengal connects Assam with the rest of 
the Indian Union. [d. at 83. 
3 See SHEKHAR GUPTA, ASSAM: A VALLEY DIVIDED 15-16 (1984). 
83 
84 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:83 
are taken to protect and preserve the existence and viability of Assam's 
different ethnic groups, this tension will almost certainly erupt again 
into even greater ethnic violence. 
When the Assamese "movement against foreigners" was launched 
twelve years ago, it was labeled variously as secessionist, anti-Muslim, 
and anti-Bengali.4 The Assamese involved in the movement have long 
denied these characterizations. They insist that their struggle to "pro-
tect" Assam from non-Indians is not a religious, ethnic, or separatist 
movement. Rather, it is a national movement against the continued 
presence of foreigners in Assam, and is designed to succeed where 
both the Indian government and the Indian Constitution have failed.5 
Indeed, there are millions of illegal Nepalese and Bengali immi-
grants in Assam, and the Indian government has failed in its duty to 
prevent this illegal migration.6 Nevertheless, it is also true that the 
Assamese have been agitating not only to expel foreigners, but also to 
protect the Assamese language and culture and preserve Assamese 
dominance in the state's political arena.7 It would be oversimplifying 
the issue to characterize the conflict in Assam solely as a matter of 
Indians versus non-Indians. A more honest approach recognizes that 
the growing non-Assamese groups in the state genuinely threaten the 
Assamese identity with extinction, and that the purpose of the move-
ment is to stop this threat. Although the casus belli for the agitation 
might be Indian nationalism, it is Assamese sub nationalism that is its 
driving force. 8 
Part II of this Note examines the Assamese search for identity, the 
nature of immigration and internal migration in northeast India, and 
4 AMIYA KUMAR DAS, AsSAM'S AGONY: A Socio-EcONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS at ix 
(1982). 
5 See MAHESH JOSHI, AsSAM: THE INDIAN CONFLICT 51 (1981). The Assamese believe the 
conflict should be regarded as an issue of Indians versus non-Indians, and it is only because of 
political machinations that the issue has been deliberately confused with subnationalism. Id. at 
50-5l. 
6 See BIMAL J. DEV & DILIP K. LAHIRI, ASSAM MUSLIMS: POLITICS AND COHESION 155--60 
(1985); DAS, supra note 4, at 7. 
7 See JOSHI, supra note 5, at 5l. 
8UDAYON MISRA, NORTH-EAST INDIA: QUEST FOR IDENTITY 66 (1988). Subnationalism and 
minority rights are probably the most serious threats to Indian unity today. See Raju Gopalakrish-
nan, "Multi-Ethnic, Multi-Religious India Questions Future Unity," REUTERS, jan. 21, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. It is fair to say that how the Assamese situation is 
resolved will affect strongly how the national and state governments treat the issues of migration, 
subnationalism, and minority rights throughout India. The resolution to the conflict in Assam's 
Brahmaputra Valley will have considerable influence on those persons in Pakistani~ccupied 
Kashmir trying to return to India, on the communal strife in the Punjab, and even with regard 
to Tamils leaving Sri Lanka and Indians emigrating from East Africa. 
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the problems created by Assam's increasing population. Part III pre-
sents an analysis of minority rights within Assam's ever-changing de-
mography, and discusses what value these rights have within Assam's 
changing economic and political situation. Part IV introduces (1) the 
grassroots movement initiated to oust foreigners from Assam, (2) the 
violence that arose from this movement, and (3) the potential solution 
that was agreed upon by the Assamese and India's central government. 
Lastly, Part V offers some additional solutions on how to curb the 
current problems stemming from ethnic tension between the indige-
nous Assamese and the immigrant Bengali populations. Any steps 
designed to prevent the further alienation of the Assamese people will 
be difficult to undertake, and the following suggestions are intended 
only to be a starting point toward resolving Assam's problems of ethnic 
conflict. Nonetheless, these steps are necessary if the Assamese hope 
to stabilize the tensions between the different groups of the land. 
II. AsSAM: THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 
Through long periods of history, different ethnic groups migrated 
to Assam and formed a composite population.9 These early migrants 
were few in number, and had no choice but to assimilate into the 
existing population and its culture in order to survive.l° As each of 
these groups integrated with the existing society, they lost their sepa-
rate identities, and contributed to the growth of a common Assamese 
culture. ll The political frontiers of Assam advanced and receded over 
the centuries depending upon the compulsions of history, but the 
geographical limits of the territory were confined by nature in such a 
way that the people retained their cultural distinctiveness. I2 Even the 
Ahoms from Burma, who conquered the region in 1228 and ruled for 
six hundred years, adopted the traditions, culture, and language of the 
original population. I3 Until the nineteenth century, when other Indian 
9 MRIDUL BHATTACHARJEE & SANJEEB GOSWAMI, ASSAM, AGONIES AND GRIEVANCES 2 (1985). 
IOThe major groups that migrated to Assam between the 13th and 16th centuries were the 
Brahmins and Kalitas from the Kanauj area of Uttar Pradesh, the Ahoms from Burma, and the 
Muslims from North India and Gaur in Bengal. DAS, supra note 4, at 12. All of them became 
immersed in the Assamese society and now form the core of that society. Id. at 13. 
11 BHATTACHARJEE & GoSWAMI, supra note 9, at 2. 
12Id. Assam's Brahmaputra Valley is surrounded by mountain ranges on three sides. 
13 Id.; MYRON WEINER, WHEN MIGRANTS SUCCEED AND NATIVES FAIL: ASSAM AND ITS MI-
GRANTS 10 (1975). Mughal power spread across northern India from the 13th to 18th centuries, 
yet the Ahoms (from which the word Assam is derived) successfully repulsed these invaders and 
resisted incorporation into the Mughal empire. "To this day, the Assamese speak with great pride 
of their resistance to 'Muslim aggression,' and to the successful spread of [Hinduism] throughout 
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ethnic groups expanded into Assam in greater numbers, the Assamese 
people formed a distinct homogeneous cultural and linguistic entity 
among the myriad groups of South Asia.14 
A. Immigration to Assam 
Far from being "instruments of cultural diffusion and social inte-
gration,"15 migrant groups often generate new tensions and increase 
racial, linguistic, and religious conflict. Clashes between indigenous 
and migrant communities have often been a prominent feature of 
politics in multiethnic countries. In Nigeria, violent attacks against 
immigrant Ibo settlers precipitated the country's 1967 civil war. I6 In 
Malaysia, where many Chinese have lived for as long as the native 
Malays, "antagonism toward the Chinese is always defined in terms of 
a conflict between indigenous residents ... and Chinese migrants."17 
In Assam, the presence of migrant groups has caused similar tension. 
The vast number of "outsiders" in Assam has upset the state's once-ex-
isting demographic and economic balance, and threatens the As-
samese culture with extinction. IS The growing numbers of various 
migrant and immigrant groups may already have reduced the As-
samese people to an ethnic minority in their own homeland.I9 
1. Plantation Migrants 
The first significant migration to Assam followed the British con-
quest in 1826.20 Having discovered tea in Assam, the British wanted to 
the Brahmaputra Valley ... at a time when Muslim influence elsewhere [in India] was at its 
zenith." Id. 
14BHA'ITACHARjEE & GOSWAMI, supra note 9, at 3. 
15DonaldJ. Bogue, Internal Migratiun, in THE STUDY OF POPULATION: AN INVENTORY AND 
APPRAISAL 487 (Philip Hauser & Otis Duncan eds., 1969). 
16WEINER, supra note 13, at 1. 
17Id. at 1. 
18 See BHAWANI SINGH, POLITICS OF ALIENATION IN AsSAM, at vii (1984). 
19Id. Few tribal groups remain in Assam today, and since the early 19th century, the main 
linguistic conflict in Assam has been between the two predominant languages: Assamese and 
Bengali. WEINER, supra note 13, at 5-7. Although Assamese is the language of most of the 
indigenous people, Bengali-speakers have registered a steady increase in numbers since Indian 
independence. See SINGH, supra note 18, at 4. One difficulty in determining the number of 
Bengali-speakers is that many illegal immigrants to Assam from Bangladesh hide their linguistic 
identity and declare Assamese to be their mother tongue so as to escape detection. Id. Whereas 
Bengali Hindus have received sanctuary in Assam under the cover of Indian government policy 
directives that prohibit the deportation of Hindu refugees, this facility never has been extended 
to Muslim refugees. Id. "A sense of insecurity thus compels a Bengali Muslim migrant to declare 
Assamese his mother tongue in order to escape detection and eventual deportation. This has 
complicated the language question in Assam and added an inflammable dimension to it." Id. 
2oBHA'ITACHARjEE & GoSWAMI, supra note 9, at 20. At this time of early British imperial 
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cultivate and sell the commodity, but the local Assamese had no inter-
est in working on tea plantations.21 Eventually, the British resorted to 
recruiting indigent tribespeople from Bihar to work in Assam as inden-
tured servants.22 As the tea industry boomed, so did the influx of 
millions of migrant Bihari tea workers.23 They never posed an eco-
nomic, cultural, or political threat to the Assamese, however, because 
many of these migrants were seasonal laborers who returned to their 
home states in the off-season.24 The ones who did remain generally 
assimilated into the Assamese way of life by learning the Assamese 
language and adopting Assamese Hindu rituals into their own Hindu 
culture.25 To this day, these plantation migrants do not live in areas 
inhabited by the Assamese nor do they engage in labor ordinarily 
undertaken by Assamese, and therefore they are in no sense rivals to 
the Assamese.26 
2. Bengali Hindu Migrants 
Mter annexing Assam in 1826, the British recruited Bengali of-
ficials for Assam's administration.27 Bengal had been the first region in 
India conquered by the British, and by the time Assam was incorpo-
rated into the British Raj, Bengalis had already had extensive contact 
with the English people.28 Many were educated in missionary schools 
and had received British administrative training.29 As Assam needed 
more clerks, judges, tax collectors, and so forth, greater numbers of 
Bengali officials and their families migrated to the province, assuming 
expansion in India, it was necessary for East India Company officials to form political subdivisions 
of the country. They had no perspective of India as a British dominion (because it had not yet 
become one), but nevertheless needed to provide a suitable administration machinery for the 
territory that came intermittently into their hands. See id. In the case of Assam, the territory was 
simply incorporated into the already-existing province of Bengal. WEINER, supra note 13, at 11. 
No thought was given to Assam's homogeneity or the problems the Assamese might face under 
Bengali domination. M.R. PALANDE, INTRODUCTION TO THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 205 (1956). 
21 See WEINER, supra note 13, at 15. Epidemics and invasions t,rom Burma in the past had 
depopulated much of the region, and there was little incentive for the local Assamese to work as 
low-income wage laborers in unhealthy jungle terrain, when there was much available land and 
better prospects elsewhere. Id. 
22Id. at 16. 
23 See id. at 17. 
24WEINER, supra note 13, at 18. 
25 SINGH, supra note 18, at 78. 
26 WEINER, supra note 13, at 18. Quite the opposite, the Assamese regard them as "model 
migrants." SINGH, supra note 18, at 78. 
27WEINER, supra note 13, at 19. 
28 SINGH, supra note 18, at 69. 
29Id. Because the revenue administration and judiciary offices in Assam were based on the 
administrative structure of neighboring Bengal-which had operated already for 70 years-the 
British thought it obviously best to recruit Bengalis for Assam's administration. Id. at 68-69. 
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most of Assam's administrative positions and monopolizing Assam's 
professional positions.30 By the beginning of the twentieth century, 
practically all of Assam's doctors, lawyers, teachers, and journalists, as 
well as railway and post office workers were Bengali Hindu migrants. 31 
Because the Bengali and Assamese languages have many similarities, 
the Bengalis were able to convince the British that the Assamese lan-
guage was merely a "corrupt and vulgar dialect" and that Bengali 
should become the official language of courts and schools in Assam.32 
When the Government of Bengal designated Bengali as Assam's official 
language in 1831, the services of Bengalis became indispensable in 
government schools because local teachers were not available in ade-
quate numbers to impart lessons in Bengali, which had become the 
medium of instruction.33 For the next forty years, the majority As-
samese were unable to use their own language in public schools, 
courts, and government offices.34 It was not until 1873 that the As-
samese succeeded in persuading the British to recognize Assamese as 
a separate language, and to establish it again as the medium of instruc-
tion in schools and as the language of administrative affairs.35 
Although the number of educated Assamese entering the teaching 
profession and Assam's administrative services has grown since Indian 
independence in 1947, economic competition between Bengali Hin-
dus and the Assamese for public employment remains keen. 36 To this 
day, the Assamese are resentful of the nineteenth-century attempt at 
"Bengalization" of the Assamese people and the efforts of the Bengalis 
to treat the local population as culturally inferior.37 
30ld. at 69. 
311d. The majority of educated Bengalis were Hindus. Most Bengali Muslims (disenchanted 
after British military victories over the Muslim Mughals) rejected Western education, and there-
fore did not aspire to the Indian Civil Service. See RA. SCHERMERHORM, ETHNIC PLURALITY IN 
INDIA 162--63 (1978). 
32 E.A. GAIT, CENSUS OF INDIA: ASSAM, 1892, at 157 (1892), cited in WEINER, supra note 13, 
at 20. 
33H.K. BARPUJARI, ASSAM: IN THE DAYS OF THE COMPANY 266-67 (1963), quoted in DAS, 
supra note 4, at 25. 
34 See JOSHI, supra note 5, at 43. 
35 MAHESWAR NEOG, PLEAS FOR ASSAM AND ASSAMESE 22-23 (1977). In 1874, a separate 
province of Assam was established, and, except for a brief period, remained intact until the 
partition of India in 1947. DAS, supra note 4, at 13. In 1905, the Governor General of India, Lord 
Curzon, partitioned Bengal into a predominantly Bengali Muslim province in the east that 
included Assam, and a predominantly Hindu province in the west. WEINER, supra note 13, at 11. 
Bengali Hindus resented partition of their province, and the Assamese also resented incorpora-
tion into partitioned Bengal. In 1912, the arrangement was annulled, and the provinces reverted 
to their pre-1905 borders. DAS, supra note 4, at 13. 
36 SeeJOSHI, supra note 5, at 162; WEINER, supra note 13, at 39-40. 
37 See WEINER, supra note 13, at 21. Because Bengalis were considered more skilled, better 
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3. Bengali Muslim Migrants 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, most of Assam's countryside 
remained relatively sparsely populated. As such, great numbers of 
Bengali Muslim farmers migrated to the western regions of Assam to 
take advantage of the available land.38 During these early years, lack of 
communication facilities and transportation opportunities compelled 
these Bengali Muslims to sever all links with their former homeland.39 
Although necessity forced these early migrants to assimilate into the 
Assamese language and culture, the process of assimilation stopped 
after the Bengalis began arriving in larger numbers.40 By the early 
1900s, East Bengali (Muslim) migrant settlers constituted twenty per-
cent of the border district populations.4l As they gained possession of 
land rights, they concentrated in certain areas of Assam and formed 
linguistic-cultural "islands" within the larger Assamese community.42 
Thereafter, they functioned as self-contained communities, speaking 
the Bengali language and enjoying their own cultural traditions. 43 
B. Population Increases in Assam 
During the first half of the twentieth century, the nonindigenous 
population of Assam grew from a half million (out of a total population 
of 2.2 million) ,44 to three million (out of a total population of seven 
million).45 Even at this early stage, the British were not indifferent to 
the tensions developing between the indigenous inhabitants and the 
immigrants. In 1920, they initiated the "Line System," a measure that 
protected the Assamese by prohibiting migrants from settling in par-
ticular regions of the province.46 In 1928, the British inaugurated a 
educated, and harder working than the Assamese, it was natural that tensions would rise between 
the two ethnic groups. See DAVID L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 172 (1985). Myron 
Weiner reflected the feelings of the Assamese in Sons of the Soil, describing the existence of 
"migrants [as] psychologically threatening because their very presence may imply a defect on the 
part of the local people." SONS OF THE SOIL, supra note 1, at 353. 
38 See WEINER, supra note 13, at 24. 
39 MISRA, supra note 8, at 60. 
40 See id. at 60-61. 
41 See WEINER, supra note 13, at 24. 
42 MISRA, supra note 8, at 60. 
43 See id. 
44 See AMALENDU GUHA, PLANTER-RAJ TO SWARAJ: FREEDOM STRUGGLE AND ELECTORAL 
POLITICS IN ASSAM, 1826-1947, at 39-45 (1977) (figures are from 1901 census), cited in DAS, 
supra note 4, at 26. 
45 See DAS, supra note 4, at 26 (figures are from 1947 estimates). 
46 See GUPTA, supra note 3, at 102-04; see generally DEV & LAHIRI, supra note 6, at 23-32. 
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"compact colonization scheme," which allotted specific areas for mi-
grant settlement, and "outlined land that would be left vacant to 
accommodate the future progeny of the Assamese people."47 Neither 
of these systems, however, successfully prevented immigrant encroach-
ment onto Assamese-held lands.48 In sparsely populated Assam, immi-
gration was bound to continue as an unavoidable economic impera-
tive.49 
Mter India's partition in 1947, the Indian and Pakistani govern-
ments established a two-year "grace period" during which Hindus in 
Pakistan could settle in India and Muslims in India could emigrate to 
Pakistan.50 Pakistanis who migrated to India during the grace period 
automatically became Indian citizens.51 Mter July 26, 1949, however, 
immigration was possible only by completing certain legal procedures 
(visa applications, for example), and unrestricted cross-border migra-
tion should have ceased.52 This was not the result. In terms of both 
natural resources and opportunities for cultivating land, economic 
imbalances between East Pakistan and Assam remained sufficiently 
great so that "even the existence of an international boundary, the 
imposition of a variety of legal restrictions, and the presence of an 
Assamese government [all failed to] stem the flow of Bengali Muslims 
into Assam. "53 
Estimates indicate that Assam's population increased from 14.6 
million to 22.9 million during the 1970s.54 This increase of 56.6% in 
one decade cannot be attributed to a natural population growth alone, 
especially when the rest of India registered an increase of 24.7% during 
the same period. 55 Illegal immigration is the only explanation that 
accounts for the discrepancy. Conservative estimates place the total 
number of illegal immigrants currently in Assam (almost all of them 
Bengalis) at over six million persons. 56 Combined with the five million 
legal Bengali migrants, the total number of Bengalis now living in 
Assam almost certainly outnumbers the number of indigenous As-
47 DAS, supra note 4, at 27. 
48 See GUPTA, supra note 3, at 102. In many places, the scheme failed to prevent the 
indigenous population from selling its landholdings to immigrants who offered good prices. In 
addition, demarcation maps were drawn crudely by hand, and were altered by corrupt officials 
at will. Id. 
49 See DAS, supra note 4, at 31. 
50 See id. 
51Id. 
52 See id. 
53 WEINER, supra note 13, at 29. 
54 See DAS, supra note 4, at 38. 
55 See id. 
56SANJAYYA, AsSAM: A CRISIS OF IDENTITY 10 (1980). 
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samese.57 Although the 1991 census figures are not yet available (nor 
even the 1981 figures), the general consensus today is that Assam's 
population is one-third indigenous Assamese and tribals, one-third 
legal non-Assamese, and one-third illegal foreigners. 58 
C. The Balkanization of Assam 
The problem the Assamese face today is that it soon may be 
themselves who constitute an island within a sea of Bengalis. The 
constant stream of immigrants from across the Bangladesh border has 
altered the demographic composition of Assam, transforming the 
once-dominant Assamese into a minority group within Assam.59 The 
Assamese fear that being reduced to an ethnic minority in their own 
homeland will lead to the extinction of their culture and their iden-
tity.60 Ironically, the Assamese themselves have been guilty of ethnic 
domination over minority cultures. Forty years ago, Assam comprised 
a much larger area than it does today.61 Ethnic tension and violence 
between the Assamese and indigenous tribal groups, however, forced 
the balkanization of what was once India's only province east of Ben-
gal.62 
When Assam was established as a full-fledged state in the Indian 
Union in 1947, the Assamese realized that they had significantly more 
power under the new Indian Constitution than ever before under the 
British. Possessing independent power for the first time in 120 years, 
the majority Assamese were blind and indifferent to the claims of the 
Bengali minority groups and the tribal communities for a share in the 
fruits of independence.63 Instead of trying to integrate the minority 
tribal groups within Assamese society, the Assamese endeavored to 
acculturate them by imposing the Assamese language upon them.64 But 
whereas the British had controlled the Assamese mountain tribes by 
wielding forcefully the power of central imperial authority, inde-
pendent India instituted a policy of conciliating these subnationalities 
rather than alienating them by force. 65 Feeling the Assamese political 
57 Id.; DAS, supra note 4, at 3. 
58 See DAS, supra note 4, at 39; see also SARO] CHAKRABARTY, THE UPHEAVAL YEARS IN 
NORTH-EAST INDIA 206 (1986). 
59 See DAS, supra note 4, at 3. 
60Id. 
6! SINGH, supra note 18, at 10. 
62 See generally id. at 10-14. 
63 See B.M. PuGH, THE STORY OF A ThIBAL 30 (1971), quoted in GUPTA, supra note 3, at 76. 
64 SINGH, supra note 18, at 14. 
65Id. at 13. This afforded the minority tribes of Assam the freedom to demand a separate 
place in the Indian Union to ensure that their cultural distinctiveness would be maintained. 
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embrace tighten, the minority hill tribes of Assam mobilized in the 
late 1950s for greater autonomy and for their share in Indian inde-
pendence.66 The passing of the Assam Official Language Act in 1960 
raised fears and suspicions in the minds of the different hill tribes, and 
accelerated tribal separation from Assam.67 The Act specified Assamese 
as the official state language and the medium of instruction in schools 
throughout Assam.68 In the mountainous regions where Assamese was 
not the native language, this chauvinistic move on the part of the 
Assamese-dominated provincial legislature was met with great opposi-
tion.69 Fearing that Assamese linguistic expansion would eventually 
lead to the elimination of their own cultural identity, the tribal groups 
increased their agitation for the creation of new states within Assam 
wherein they could practice self-determination of language and cul-
ture. 70 As tribal riots and violence escalated during the 1960s, the 
central government finally intervened, and Assam underwent a pro-
cess of phased vivisection. 71 One by one, the government excised the 
tribal areas from the existing body of Assam and constituted them as 
separate states and Union Territories. 72 Today, most Assamese still 
suffer from a deep sense of hurt over the breakup of their state, and 
generally hold the central government responsible for Assam's "humili-
ating reduction to the status of a mini-state, one amongst many under 
shared governors [that is] not primus inter pares, but a mere equal."73 
66 See id. at 14. 
67MISRA, supra note 8, at 122. 
68 GUPTA, supra note 3, at 76. The Act did not apply to the Bengali-dominated district of 
Cachar, where protests resulted in Bengali remaining the language of instruction and admin-
istration. See BHATTACHARjEE & GoSWAMI, supra note 9, at 42. 
69 GUPTA, supra note 3, at 76. 
70 SINGH, supra note 18, at 14. 
71Id. at 10-11. 
72NARI RUSTOMjI, IMPERILLED FRONTIERS 11 (1983). Mountain range areas dominated by 
different tribes were formed into separate political identities. Nagaland was carved out of Assam 
as a separate state in 1962-63. Meghalaya came into existence in 1971. The Union Territories of 
Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh followed soon after in 1972. Today's Assam is much smaller 
than it was following Indian independence. By 1978, the state's real area had shrunk from 223,590 
to 78,523 square kilometers. SINGH, supra note 18, at 10-11. 
73 RUSTOMjI, supra note 72, at 12. It is misleading, however, to place the entire blame for 
Assam's dissolution on the Central Indian government. The hill states' movements, which began 
during the mid-1950s, were discouraged actively by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and there 
is little reason to believe that the breakup of Assam was solely the result of political machinations 
by the Central Indian government. GUPTA, supra note ,3, at 77-78. Indeed, New Delhi can cite 
that it was the Assamese leadership, which (having inherited the mantle of the "guardian of the 
region" from the British) failed to keep its state borders intact, because of its inability to gauge 
tribal aspirations coupled with its policy of linguistic majority domination. Id. at 75, 77. 
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D. Official Indifference and Political Connivance 
The creation of separate tribal states both reduced Assam's cul-
tural heterogeneity and brought tensions between the Assamese and 
Bengali communities into sharper relief. 74 Considering the previous 
Assamese disdain for the central government's intrusion into Assam's 
internal affairs, it is ironic that the Assamese people's most furtive 
complaint today is that there is insufficient central government inter-
vention in Assam to protect the Assamese people from "foreign" domi-
nation. 
Efforts have been made in the past to prevent illegal immigration. 
In 1950, the Indian Parliament passed the Immigrants (Expulsion from 
Assam) Act, which granted the central government the power to re-
move from India or Assam immigrants whose stay in Assam was detri-
mental to the economic interests of India. 75 The Act allowed immi-
gration to Assam only for those Pakistanis displaced because of civil 
disturbances. 76 Deciding that this legislation discriminated against Mus-
lims in favor of Hindus, however, the Parliament repealed the law in 
1957.77 
A plan that initially had more success was the Prevention of Infil-
tration to Assam Plan (PIP), adopted by the central government in 
1964.78 Under this scheme, hundreds of border watch posts were con-
structed, a Border Security Force was established, and infiltrators who 
were caught were expelled from India immediately.79 During the first 
three years of the plan's implementation, 190,000 illegal immigrants 
were identified, arrested, and deported.80 But the scheme soon fell 
victim to corruption and inefficiency: from 1968 to 1971, 20,800 infil-
trators were detected-a mere tenth of the number of infiltrators 
caught during the first three years.81 In 1975, only 405 persons were 
intercepted, and in 1976, only one person was detained by the Border 
Security Force and subsequently returned to Bangladesh.82 The role 
74WEINER, supra note 13, at 14. 
75 See CHAKRABARTY, supra note 58, at 130; see also Mahesh Joshi, Cost of Being Reasonable, 
PATRIOT (New Delhi), May 28, 1980, cited in JOSHI, supra note 5, at 66. 
76 DAS, supra note 4, at 56. 
77 ld. The law was discriminatory because Hindus could claim displaced status more easily 
than Muslims. ld.; see also GUPTA, supra note 3, at Ill. 
78 See GUPTA, supra note 3, at 201 (full text). 
79 See DAS, supra note 4, at 57; GUPTA, supra note 3, at 165. 
80 DAS, supra note 4, at 57. 
81 ld. at 57. 
82 ld. at 59. This last statistic attests to the complete uselessness of the PIP, especially consid· 
ering that-based on the increase of voters registering with the election commission-officials 
estimated the number of illegal immigrants to Assam to be 7500 per day at that time. ld. 
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and usefulness of the Border Security Force today is essentially nonex-
istent. 
Blame for the failure of these official acts should lie with the 
national government, which is responsible for maintaining secure in-
ternational borders with India's neighboring countries.83 Nevertheless, 
the local Assamese state government is not entirely without fault. In 
some cases, Assam's Congress Party and Muslim members of Assam's 
Legislative Assembly have encouraged the migration by helping settle 
the Bangladeshis, by arranging for them to receive ration cards, and 
by illegally enrolling thousands of them on voting lists.84 In return, they 
have demanded the immigrants' loyalty and their votes.85 If the gov-
ernment imposed tighter measures to stem the flow of Bengali immi-
grants, and prevented illegal immigration by so doing, these politicians 
would lose their electoral base. Not wanting to jeopardize their politi-
cal power, local politicians therefore have remained largely indifferent 
to the issue of illegal immigration.86 
III. INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP RIGHTS IN INDIA 
In India, the residents of each state directly elect the members of 
state legislatures.87 These legislatures have significant powers regarding 
the function and administration of their states.88 The Assamese there-
fore fear that the loss of their political power would result in the loss 
83Not only was the preventative work beyond the financial resources of Assam's state gov-
ernment, the responsibility for PIP was given to India's national army, thus making the plan 
specifically devoid of any local cultural and political commitment on the part of those charged 
with the responsibility of preventing infiltration. JOSHI, supra note 5, at 74. 
84 Sanjoy Hazarika, India Admits Failure to Cut Bangladesh Influx, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 16, 1992, 
at AI. 
85 ld. These immigrants have voted consistently for the ruling Congress Party under the 
direction of village chiefs "with whom the Congress Party established close political links. " MISRA, 
supra note 8, at 77. 
86For a descriptive analysis of how the Congress Party has tried to legitimate illegal immi-
grants to secure massive electoral support, see SINGH, supra note 18, at 70-76. 
87PALANDE, supra note 20, at 418. Legislative representation is based on the population of 
constituencies as determined by the most recent census. As in the United States, the repre-
sentation of the Indian states and union territories is readjusted at both the national and state 
levels in light of the new population figures. ld. at 419. 
88 These powers include, inter alia, the regulation of land revenues, official state language 
recognition, and taxes on agricultural income, professions, and trades. ld. at 227,489. Bills passed 
by the directly elected Legislative Assembly also must be approved by the State Governor (who 
is appointed by the Indian President), but this is largely a formality. The Governor may assent to 
the bill, withhold his assent, or reserve the bill for the consideration of the Indian President (if, 
and only if, the bill might derogate from the powers of the Supreme or High Courts). ld. at 433. 
The Legislative Assembly can still override the Governor if the bill is not accepted, but the 
Assembly has no power to override a presidential veto. ld. at 434. 
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of their linguistic and cultural privileges. Without weighted repre-
sentation or reserved seats in the State Assembly, a "new" Assamese 
minority would have no recourse should a Bengali majority choose 
Bengali to be the official government language, or impose taxes on 
traditional Assamese occupations that favor the Bengali community 
over the Assamese.89 The Assamese, however, are not alone in possess-
ing such a fear. Each minority group in Assam already suffers this same 
disadvantage. In deciding what rights should be guaranteed to each 
ethnic group of Assam, it is important to examine first what individual 
and group rights already exist in the state, and who is entitled to these 
rights. 
A. Constitutional Rights for Minorities in India 
The Indian Constitution allows absolute freedom of movement 
and settlement in any part of the country for all Indian citizens.9o 
Despite India's reorganization of states along linguistic lines, this free-
dom of movement has led to the widespread growth of ethnic minority 
communities far removed from their original home states. Therefore, 
it has become very important for the government to secure and en-
force the protection of minority groups. 
The primary right of all groups in India is the right to equality.91 
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution asserts that "the State shall not 
deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of 
the laws within the territory of India." Article 15 expands upon the 
concept of equal protection by stating that "the State shall not discrimi-
nate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, 
place of birth or any of them." Article 29 of the Indian Constitution 
establishes that linguistic, cultural, and religious minorities of India 
have the right to preserve their language, script, and culture. This right 
includes "the protection and preservation of religious views, moral 
89 As stated in PALANDE, supra note 20, at 172: 
It is generally agreed that mere counting of heads is not necessarily an infallible 
guide for the assessment of ability and for the assurance of fair play and justice. It 
may be that, infatuated by a sense of profound self-esteem and of self-righteousness 
and by a consciousness of power which springs from the strength of numbers, the 
majority may make, wittingly or unwittingly, serious encroachments on the legiti-
mate freedom of the individual, particularly on the freedom of those who differ 
from them. A great danger to democracy lies in its tendency to be misunderstood 
and misconstrued as being essentially the rule of numbers, whereas the emphasis 
should really be on rule by argument, persuasion and consent. 
90 PALANDE, supra note 20, at 178. 
91JAY A. SIGLER, MINORITY RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 140 (1983). 
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beliefs and cultural practices. "92 Article 30 guarantees that "all minori-
ties, whether based on religion or language, have the right to establish 
and administer educational institutions of their choice," and that the 
government must subsidize these institutions to some extent. The 
Indian Parliament cannot, in granting aid, discriminate against any 
educational institution on the ground that it is under the management 
of a minority.93 Furthermore, the Constitution requires state and local 
governments to "provide adequate facilities for instruction in the 
mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging 
to linguistic minority groups. "94 
There have been instances throughout the world where equality 
has been granted to minorities under law, yet has not been manifested 
in fact.95 This situation exists in Assam today. Although linguistic mi-
norities in Assam are granted certain privileges to help secure cultural 
protection, disparities still exist among ethnic groups in terms of edu-
cational opportunity. The predominantly Bengali-speaking district of 
Cachar in Assam is the only district where Bengali is the language of 
instruction beyond primary school.96 In many other regions of Assam, 
Bengali communities do not have the financial ability to establish their 
own schools. Thus, that a certain group in Assam has the "right to 
establish and administer an educational institution" does not always 
mean that the group will be able to exercise this right.97 
B. Economics and Economic Rights as a Catalyst for Ethnic Tension 
Another cause of ethnic tension in Assam is the lack of legislation 
guaranteeing economic rights to Assam's competing ethnic groups. 
The blame for Assam's economic woes lies in part with the central 
government, which is not paying Assam enough for the goods and 
92Id. at 141. The Indianjudiciary has interpreted this right broadly so as to include the right 
to agitate for the protection of a particular language. Id. 
93 INDIA CONST. art. 30(1), (2). 
94INDIA CON ST. art. 350A. 
95 For example, the original goal of the 1960s U.s. civil rights legislation was to unify, remove 
discrimination, and provide equality under the law. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
et seq. (1988). Yet, it is naive to believe that genuine equality has actually resulted for minorities 
in the United States with regard to jobs, housing, and educational opportunities. 
96GUPTA, supra note 3, at 137. An attempt in 1972 by the Academic Council of Gauhati 
University-which has jurisdiction over Cachar-to deny students the option of taking examina-
tions in Bengali was blocked when the Supreme Court granted a stay order affirming that the 
university's decision to restrict the medium of instruction to Assamese was in violation of Article 
30 of the Indian Constitution, which assures protection of linguistic minorities. WEINER, supra 
note 13, at 47. 
97 INDIA CON ST. art. 30(1), (2). 
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energy resources the state produces.98 Assam is one of India's richest 
resource states, yet the Assamese people have never received a fair 
share of the development resources generated by the state.99 Migrant 
communities, however, also have had an adverse impact on Assam's 
economic situation. 1Oo The presence of Bengali migrants has exacer-
bated the deteriorating economic condition of skilled and unskilled 
indigenous Assamese laborers: millions of illegal immigrants not only 
have caused massive unemployment in Assam, but also have lowered 
Assam's standard ofliving. 101 State government spending on education, 
health programs, and other social services for non-Indians is increasing 
at the expense of native Assamese, who still provide most of the state 
revenues. 102 To redress the situation, the Assamese have demanded that 
the central government create a "right of access" to Assam's natural 
resources, limited to those who can prove themselves to be "authentic" 
Assamese. 103 Granting special economic privileges to the Assamese, 
however, would certainly raise constitutional questions. 
Originally, under the Indian Constitution, every Indian had the 
same rights of citizenship regardless of the state or part of India in 
which he or she resided.104 Recent events and the rise in state parochi-
98 DAS, supra note 4. at 225. 
99 See generally DAS, supra note 4, at 221-42. Although Assam produces more oil, tea, and 
plywood than any other state, it consistently has had net deficits in revenue. Id. at 222. These 
deficits "amounted to 180 million rupees in 1981-82. The corresponding deficits in 1980-81 and 
1979-80 were 669 and 401 million rupees respectively. This can be compared with the revenue 
surpluses in the same years registered in the two other equally underdeveloped states of India, 
viz. Bihar and Orissa." Jyotirindra Das Gupta, Ethnicity, Democracy, and Development in India: 
Assam in a General Perspective, INDIA'S DEMOCRACY 158 n.24 (Atul Kohli ed. 1988) [hereinafter 
Ethnicity, Democracy, and Development]. 
100 See generally WEINER, supra note 13, at 61-62. 
101 With the rush of immigrant labor into the labor market, especially in the agricultural 
sector where the wage rate is determined by comparative bargaining, the wage level tends to be 
lower than marginal productivity-even to subsistence level. See Binay Kumar Nath, Impact of 
Immigration on Assam's Agricultural Economy, 1 E. VorCE 50 (1980), quoted in DAS, supra note 4, 
at 47. 
102DAS, supra note 4, at 47. 
103Indigenous peoples worldwide have often been granted privileges extending to the use 
of the natural resources of their homeland (e.g., traditional hunting of particular animal species). 
Extending this privilege to the Assamese poses two problems. First, the Assamese are not "indige-
nous" people. Second, the oil, tea, and plywood industries of Assam have nothing to do with the 
ethnicity of the Assamese people. It must be remembered that ethnic claims and ethnic action 
generally are designed to serve the ethnic collectivity, but are not necessarily natural expressions 
of ethnicity. See Ethnicity, Democracy, and Development, supra note 99, at 145. 
104PALANDE, supra note 20, at 170. Although India is a federation with autonomous constitu-
ent units, there is no dual citizenship envisioned by the Indian Constitution. There is only one 
citizenship for the whole oflndia. In the United States, each state has its own citizenship and has 
the right to grant to its citizens a number of privileges that it may legally deny to others, even 
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alism, however, have subjugated this principle. Although the constitu-
tion provides freedom of movement to all Indians, this no longer 
means that a citizen will enjoy equal rights in every part of the country. 
The Indian Parliament recently barred Indian migrant settlers in Na-
galand from running for elected positions in that state. 105 The Megha-
layan Legislative Assembly has adopted a residential permit bill that 
requires citizens from outside the state to obtain a permit if they reside 
in the state for more than four months.106 In West Bengal, the Assembly 
has passed a law stipulating that anyone living in the state for more 
than ten years will be treated as a "son of the soil," thus entitling him 
or her to preferential treatment in employment. 107 Each of these ex-
amples refers to situations where state citizens are favored over non-
state citizens. If Assam's minority groups fear for their future economic 
prosperity and cultural integrity, they could agitate together for politi-
cal and economic restrictions against migrants to Assam from other 
parts of India. Such legislation probably would be constitutional, how-
ever, only if it was not ethnically biased and if it applied equally to all 
nonresidents of Assam.108 
IV. THE AsSAM MOVEMENT 
A. A Call to Arms 
The failure of Assamese politicians to compel the national govern-
ment to promote and protect Assamese interests led eventually to the 
rise of grassroots organizations devoted to maintaining the status and 
position of the Assamese in Assam.109 The first popular movement 
though they may be citizens of the U.S.A. No state of the Indian Federation possesses such a 
right. Id. 
105 Sanjoy Hazarika, India's Assam State Demanding Ban on Migration, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 13, 
1987, at 12. 
106 SONS OF THE SOIL, supra note 1, at 267. 
107Id. 
108 Although such restrictions would certainly be favored by most of Assam's ethnic minorities 
(primarily the Assamese), they probably would be opposed by the Bengali Muslims, who favor 
the continued immigration of other members of their community. It should be noted, however, 
that the Bengalis are one of the most mobile linguistic groups in India, while the Assamese are 
one of the least mobile. SINGH, supra note 18, at 68. Whereas one out of eight Bengalis, both in 
India and Bangladesh, lives outside of Bengal, 99.7% of all Assamese live in Assam. Id. This 
explains further the Assamese attitude toward non-Assamese. Being averse themselves to settling 
elsewhere, they are therefore less favorably disposed to those who do settle outside their home-
land. 
109 See Ethnicity, Democracy, and Development, supra note 99, at 159. 
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directed at the problem of illegal immigration was launched by such 
an organization: the All Assam Student Union (AASU) .110 In 1979, with 
illegal immigration at an all-time high, the AASU began agitating for 
the government to evict all illegal aliens from Assam. lll The AASU's 
main demands were (1) the detection of foreign nationals on the basis 
of the 1951 National Register of Citizens, (2) the disenfranchisement 
of foreigners by removing their names from Assam's electoral rolls, and 
(3) the deportation of foreign nationals.ll2 
When elections were scheduled for Assam's Legislative Assembly 
in late 1979, the AASU campaigned to postpone the elections until the 
foreigner issue was resolved. ll3 Despite tremendous demonstrations, 
mass picketing, and civil disobedience throughout Assam, the Indian 
Parliament ignored the demands of the popular movement and de-
cided to elect new representatives for India's Union Legislature as 
scheduled. l14 The AASU responded by protesting the legitimacy of the 
election and by initiating a blockade of all oil exports from Assam to 
other parts of IndiaYs The strategy succeeded and forced a meeting 
between the Indian government and the AASU. When Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi met AASU leaders in February 1980, she insisted that 
1971, not 1951, be used as the cutoff year for determining foreign 
nationals.116 The AASU leaders, however, insisted on the expulsion of 
all foreigners who had immigrated illegally to Assam since just after 
India's independence. ll7 Central government representatives and As-
samese leaders met more than twenty times during the next three 
years, yet they could not agree on the date after which immigrants who 
came to Assam illegally would be deported. lIS Both sides agreed that 
the people of Assam had the right to demand the expulsion offoreign-
ers, but the positional negotiation strategies used by both the central 
lloDAS, supra note 4, at 4. 
IIIId. 
112 Id. In 1979, the All Assam Gana Sanram Parishad (AAGSP) was formed as an umbrella 
organization and coordination committee for pursuing the AASU's agitation. T.S. MURTY, ASSAM: 
THE DIFFICULT YEARS-A STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 1979-83, at 12 (1983). For the 
remainder of this Note, these organizations and others will be referred to collectively as the 
"AASU" or the "Assam movement." The AASU was organized originally in 1960 during the 
movement to establish Assamese as the official state language and the medium of instruction in 
schools. For more details of the AASU and its demands, see SANJAYYA, supra note 56, at 33-37. 
113DAS, supra note 4, at 70. 
114MuRTY, supra note 112, at 25. 
115DAS, supra note 4, at 77. 
116 See SINGH, supra note 18, at 99. 
117Id. 
llS See MURTY, supra note 112, at 266. 
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government and the Assam movement leaders prevented the forma-
tion of any constructive solution to the problem at that time. 1l9 
B. What Kind of Movement? 
Whether a solution to Assam's immigration problem exists will be 
discovered only by concentrating on the motivation behind the Assam 
movement. This, in turn, involves an analysis of whether the movement 
is driven by Indian nationalism, or is rooted in deeper issues of subna-
tionalism and the rights of ethnic minorities within India. In formulat-
ing an answer, it is important to acknowledge that individuals in India 
have multiple identities in terms of community, class, and caste, and 
will choose their particular identity depending upon how it is to be 
used and for what particular purpose. Bengali Hindus in Assam might 
support Bengali Muslims in a linguistic struggle, yet support the Hindu 
Assamese if the conflict were religious. If a conflict emerged between 
the urban elite and the rural peasantry, there would be like classes of 
Assamese and Bengalis on each side of the issue. Individual multieth-
nicity in India-both in terms of plural social divisions and multiple 
personal identifications--has permitted the development of fluid loy-
alties.120 Any legal solution to the social, political, and economic move-
ments in India therefore will have a wide range of support depending 
upon the root of the conflict. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the focus of the nascent Assam 
movement was on the urgent need for establishing Assamese suprem-
acy in the areas of state services and the official state language.121 The 
goal of the movement was to affirm the right of the Assamese to control 
the resources and culture of the state.122 The targets of the early 
movement were the tribal minorities as well as the settled Bengali 
population, who continued to dominate Assam's bureaucracy, profes-
sional positions, and agricultural economy.123 The tremendous influx 
of Bengali Muslims during the 1970s, however-especially following 
the war for Bangladeshi independence from Pakistan-finally tipped 
the ethnic balance against the Assamese.124 Importantly, in addition to 
the economic, political, linguistic, and national forces already strug-
119 See SINGH, supra note 18, at 98-106. 
120 See SONS OF THE SOIL, supra note 1, at 124. 
121 See WEINER, supra note 13, at 39-40. 
122 Id. at 41-42. 
123 Id. 
124 See SINGH, supra note 18, at 77; DAS, supra note 4, at 58. 
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gling within Assam, the emergence of the "illegal" Muslim community 
added a religious dimension to the conflict. 125 
A feeling had begun to grow toward the end of the 1970s that, 
since independence, the minorities had been pampered at 
the cost of the Hindu majority. The charge of appeasement 
for electoral gain was brought particularly against the Con-
gress, which had always sought and got the vote of the mi-
norities. The highly publicized conversions to Islam of a few 
hundred untouchables in the Tamil Nadu village of Meenak-
shipuram in 1981 was propagated as the final straw. Hindu 
revivalists began saying that in Hindu-majority India, it was 
Hinduism, not Islam, that was now in danger.126 
This rising national communalist sentiment came at the appropri-
ate moment for the Assam movement, which probably was searching 
for further justification and support in its efforts to expel Bengali 
immigrants. Attacks against Muslim minorities in the early 1980s may 
have been deliberate attempts by the Assamese to use the Hindu 
element of their multiethnicity to create nationwide sympathy for the 
Assamese movement-sympathy that would not have existed had they 
emphasized only the linguistic aspects of the conflict.127 But by playing 
upon the communal aspects of the conflict in Assam, the Assamese 
revealed that their movement was not purely a "national" one. That 
the Assamese committed violence against legal as well as illegal Muslim 
residents of Assam confirmed that the issue in Assam was not just an 
Indian versus non-Indian conflict, but one based deep in ethnic na-
tionalism. 128 
C. From Ethnic Tension to Human Carnage 
From 1981 to 1983, illegal immigrants continued to cross into 
Assam from Bangladesh, tensions continued to build, and sporadic 
violence and communal clashes claimed the lives of hundreds of peo-
ple.129 In February 1983, despite enormous opposition from ethnic 
Assamese, the central government again decided to hold elections in 
Assam without first settling the foreigner issue and revising the elec-
125 See DEV & LAHIRI, supra note 6, at 156. 
126M]. AKBAR, INDIA: THE SIEGE WITHIN (CHALLENGES TO A NATION'S UNITY) 197 (1985). 
127 See Stuart Auerbach, ThlJUsands Arrested by Indian Army in Crackdown on Unrest in 
Northeast, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1980, atA24; Bengalis Go Home, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13,1980, at 44. 
128 See CHAKRABARTY, supra note 58, at 107. 
129 See generally GUPTA, supra note 3, at 39--62; CHAKRABARTY, supra note 58, at 146--78. 
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toral rollS.130 Anger within the Assamese community at the govern-
ment's imposition of elections turned violent. l3l Initially, the violence 
was directed against the government and its election machinery, but 
Assamese anger soon turned against the tribal and foreign communi-
ties.132 On February 14, 1983, the first day of the elections, violence 
spread quickly in areas dominated by antielection Assamese.133 In sev-
eral villages, dozens of Bengali Muslim voters were killed by armed 
gangs of Assamese-speaking tribals. Muslims retaliated by kidnapping 
and killing many Assamese, and the violence soon escalated beyond 
control. Over the next two weeks, as the elections continued, approxi-
mately seven thousand people lost their lives. 134 
On February 22, 1983, both houses of the Indian Parliament 
adopted resolutions condemning the killings and violence in Assam.135 
Home Minister Prakesh Sethi appealed to the people of Assam to 
cooperate with government attempts for new elections, and promised 
that the central government would resume dialogues to resolve the 
foreigner issue as soon as the situation in Assam calmed.136 Sethi em-
phasized at the same time, however, that any new dialogues would not 
be held with the Assam popular movement leadership, but instead with 
members of the newly elected Assam Legislative Assembly and repre-
sentatives of tribal and other non-Assamese minority groups.137 Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi observed at the time that "no group of people 
or movement could hold the country to ransom, however legitimate 
its demand might be."I38 Justifying the government's decision to hold 
elections in Assam, Gandhi added that "it was an inescapable constitu-
tional obligation on the part of the Government ... and that agitation 
leaders by their own action (leading to the outbursts of violence) had 
stalled the solution of the problem. "139 
By encouraging the growth of communal feelings and intercom-
munity hatred, the Assamese have prevented the emergence of a mul-
tiethnic Assam composed of varied religious and linguistic groups. The 
more desperate their movement was to deport illegal immigrants or to 
130 See SINGH, supra note 18, at 113. 
131Id. at 115. 
132Id. 
133 See GUPTA, supra note 3, at 15-16. 
IMId. 
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restrict their rights, the more it encouraged the formation of an oppo-
sition coalition that could easily dominate the Assamese.14o The escala-
tion of violence and destruction in Assam has ended progress toward 
a peaceful resolution and has succeeded only in further separating the 
different communities. The ethnic conflict in Assam is no longer an 
Assamese majority versus minority struggle for dominance, but has 
become a minorities versus minorities struggle for rights. 
D. The Assam Accord 
The first real step toward a solution to the ethnic conflict in Assam 
was the 1985 Assam Accord ("Accord"), which was brought about by 
the new national leadership of Rajiv GandhL141 The Accord called for 
(1) the expulsion of all immigrants who had entered Assam illegally 
after March 24, 1971; and (2) a ten-year disenfranchisement of illegal 
immigrants who had entered the state between 1966 and 1971.142 Those 
who came to Assam before 1966 were granted Indian citizenship.143 
The Bengali Muslim population, which had previously looked to Indira 
Gandhi for protection, withdrew its support for the Congress Party.144 
When elections were held a few months later, the Assam Gana Par-
ishad, a political party formed mainly of activists from the Assam 
movement, surprisingly won a majority in Assam's Legislative Assem-
bly.145 With an Assamese nationalist party in control of the state assem-
bly, the central government was faced again with the possibility of 
ethnic tensions and violence in Assam, and Parliament therefore de-
layed the implementation of the Accord. 146 This, in turn, led to re-
140 Ethnicity, Democracy, and Developmen~ supra note 99, at 160. Such a coalition would 
comprise Bengali Hindus, Bengali Muslims, Assamese Muslims, and even the remaining Assamese 
tri bal groups. 
141 When Indira Gandhi was assassinated by Sikh terrorists in 1984, Rajiv Gandhi inherited 
an India divided by the worst communal violence seen in the country since partition. His Congress 
Party was widely disliked for its corruption and abuse of power, and his efforts to achieve a political 
settlement in Assam may have been intended as much to regenerate support for the Congress 
Party as to solve Assam's ethnic problems. 
142 See Details of Assam Accord Given to Parliament, BRIT. BROADCASTING CORP., Aug. 17, 1985. 
143Id. 
144Jonathan S. Landay, Gandhi Loses an Election to Party Favoring Expelling Moslems, UPI, 
Dec. 18, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI File. 
145Id. 
146Mani Deb, Assam's Patience with Delhi Grows Increasingly Thin, FIN. TiMES, Feb. 3, 1988, 
at 14. In new electoral rolls, originally due to be published in September, 1993, up to one million 
people, mostly Muslim immigrants, had been disenfranchised. The Assam High Court, however-
in cases challenging the Indian Election Commission's "special guidelines" for registration in 
Assam, which included possessing a valid Indian passport, a citizenship certificate, or an Indian 
birth certificate-ordered the suspension of the publication of the new rolls. Subir Bhaumik, 
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newed agitation by the AASU. It also led to the emergence of the 
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) , a terrorist and secessionist 
organization, which continues to operate today in the more mountain-
ous regions of Assam. 147 
V. SOLUTIONS 
Any ethnic group must have certain resources before it can affirm 
itself as a group. This means that for a group's survival, the government 
must remove the conditions that lead to the group lacking the re-
sources necessary for sustaining itself.148 In Assam, ethnic conflict will 
continue as long as the various communities do not have the rights 
and resources necessary to affirm their cultures and secure their sur-
vival. 
A. Land Suggestions 
With no compromises foreseeable in the near future among Alr 
sam's minorities, one solution to Assam's problems of ethnic conflict 
would be to break the state apart again: to divide it further into smaller 
states for each of Assam's various ethnic groups. India's Constitution 
gives the federal legislature the power to form new states by any of a 
number of methods. 149 The Indian Parliament can increase or diminish 
the size of any state, alter state boundaries, and change state names. 150 
If necessary, Parliament can enact such changes even without the 
consent of the populations concerned. l5l All that is needed is for the 
President of the Parliament to ascertain the views of the affected states 
with regard to the introduction of such a bill, and then for the bill to 
be passed by Parliament.152 
India's Assam Fears New Trouble Over Poll Rolls, REUTERS, Sept. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, Reuter File. 
147Brahma Chellaney, Internal Unrest Poses Threat to India Unity, WASH. TIMES, Sept 20, 
1991, at A8. In recent years, ULFA has continued a campaign of extortion directed at the 
Assamese tea plantations (ULFA objects that most of the tea industry profits are taken out of the 
state and are not being reinvested in Assam to help the Assamese people), has kidnapped several 
government officials, and has assassinated the local leader of the human rights group Amnesty 
International. Id. 
148 Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 66 
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1265 (1991). 
149 See PALANDE, supra note 20, at 165. 
150 Id. The Indian Parliament used these powers to create the new states and union territories 
that were once a part of Assam. See SINGH, supra note 18, at 10-12; see also supra notes 71-73 
and accompanying text. 
151 See PALANDE, supra note 20, at 166. 
152Id. Because the legislative views of the states affected by the proposed changes need only 
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The primary purpose of the Assam movement is to ensure the 
continued cultural identity of the Assamese people and the betterment 
of their future economic opportunities. The best way to achieve these 
goals without creating special rights or privileges for the Assamese 
community within Assam-to the detriment of other minorities-
would be to carve out a new Assam based again on linguistic and 
cultural lines. A monolingual Assam would facilitate administration 
and obviate the ethnic jealousies and anxieties present in multilingual 
Assam. While it is possible that such "linguism" might accentuate 
disruptive tendencies and destroy the sense of a common Indian na-
tionhood, such a result is far from certain. Most of the states in north 
India-Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal, Rajasthan, etc.-are monolin-
gual, but it cannot be said that because of this factor the outlook of 
their people is less national and more separatist. 153 On the contrary, it 
is in the heterogeneous provinces where linguistic hostilities derogate 
from a sense of healthy national solidarity.154 Such hostilities might be 
avoided if people speaking differen t languages were not "unnecessarily 
huddled together. "155 
A second option would be for the three million residents of the 
Cachar District of Assam-almost all of them Bengali speakers-to be 
constituted into a separate state or Union Territory.156 The separation 
of Cachar would relieve the strain on Assam's resources and make 
available more state jobs for Assamese.157 At the same time, whatever 
shape the new unit of Cachar takes, its people would also have greater 
opportunity to fulfill their aspirations, free from Assamese control. I58 
Such a partition of Assam will not necessarily create a permanent 
solution to the problems of ethnic conflict. 159 Nevertheless, the estab-
be "ascertained," state opinion mayor may not have any influence upon federal legislative action. 
Individual minority groups therefore have no legal right to decide the status of their states within 
the Indian Union. In the case of Assam, Parliament might not feel the urgency of the ethnic 
conflict with the same degree of in tensi ty that is fel t by Assam's various minori ty grou ps. If changes 
in Assam's boundaries were thought to be in the best interest of the nation, it is conceivable that 
such changes could be brought about by parliamentary legislation even in direct opposition to 
the opinions of the parties interested and affected. Id. 
153PALANDE, supra note 20, at 208. 
154Id. 
155Id. at 209. 
156GUPTA, supra note 3, at 137. 
157This is true only for the reason that many Bengali civil servants would probably find 
employment in the new Cachar government. 
158GUPTA, supra note 3, at 137. 
159No matter how carefully the lines of the new states might be drawn, there will always be 
ethnic minority communities that will be separated from their larger self. Creating smaller units 
might therefore only reproduce the issue at a smaller level, rather than solve it. In addition, 
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lishment of a more linguistically homogeneous state would effect at 
least a temporary solution to a problem that is currently out of control. 
When ethnic conflicts escalate to a certain level-as in the case of 
Assam where thousands have been killed-they assume a status differ-
ent from similar, but less violent, situations; dire situations occasionally 
demand drastic solutions. Nevertheless, there would be significant 
opposition to any moves to partition Assam. Certainly, the leader-
ship of the Assam movement would contest fiercely the separation of 
Cachar.160 They have a genuine fear that allowing Cachar to become 
an independent region within the Indian Union would lead only to 
greater Bengali immigration to Assam. 161 By surrendering jurisdiction 
over Cachar, the government of Assam would have no control over the 
number of immigrants whom the new Cachar government might "al-
low" to enter India from bordering Bangladeshi districts. Once the 
Cachar government permitted these immigrants to become Indian 
citizens, they could then continue on to Assam with impunity under 
their right to "freedom of movement" as Indian citizens.162 
Other arguments exist against dividing Assam into smaller states. 
If the area reserved to form post-partition Assam was too small, then 
the new Assam might not be economically self-sufficient or politically 
viable. Its administrative machinery might prove inadequate to meet 
the various needs of social uplift according to modern standards.163 
Such a state might then become a burden to the rest of the Indian 
Union. 164 Furthermore, abridging Assam to create a special state for 
the Assamese might trigger a domino effect. There are hundreds of 
ethnic groups in India which might then also demand similar state 
status. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recently stated 
the problem succinctly: "If every ethnic, religious or linguistic group 
claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation; and 
peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever 
more difficult to achieve."165 
freedom of movement would always allow "outsiders" in already·existing Assam to migrate to the 
new Assam, and again create linguistic tension. 
160 GUPTA, supra note 3, at 138. 
161Id. 
162 PALANDE, supra note 20, at 178. 
163 Id. at 207. 
164 This issue is debatable, but the certainty of financial stability and solvency is an indispens-
able prerequisite in the granting of autonomy or self-government to any minority group, if only 
for the reason that the rest of the country might suffer from the existence of a poor, economically 
unviable state. 
165 Michael Reisman, My Self-Determination, Your Extinction, LA. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1992, at B7. 
These arguments notwithstanding, such turmoil might be the "necessary pain attending the birth 
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Finally, maintaining the status quo in Assam has advantages in a 
larger national sense. Assam brings together two major regional groups 
under one administrative system. A capacity for assimilation and inte-
gration is as essential for India's continued development as is the 
strength that derives from a nation's innate coherence. 166 Rather than 
derogate from a sense of healthy national solidarity, continued contact 
between the Assamese and the Bengalis may be beneficial because it 
helps "round off the angularities of a narrow ethnocentricity and 
inculcates a broader national vision, which is so urgently needed in 
India."167 
Regardless of what happens to Assam's borders, the Assamese do 
not want their political dismemberment. It would be unfortunate if 
their natural and cultural evolutionary process was hampered by any 
further dissipation of their collective strength. If Assam is to be broken 
up, the Assamese community should be separated intact-it would be 
unfortunate and wrong if their composite culture split into ineffective 
political fragments. 
B. Language Suggestions 
The survival of a group's culture depends in large part on its 
language, because language is the means by which meaning and struc-
ture are given to cultural activities. 168 Ensuring the use and preserva-
tion of Assam's various languages would lessen minority dissatisfaction 
with the lack of respect for their cultures. Therefore, if altering Assam's 
borders proves infeasible, another option to curb ethnic conflict would 
be to change once more Assam's official language. 
Any change to Assam's official language, however, would be met 
with substantial opposition. The Assamese language movement of the 
1950s evolved from a deep-seated feeling of inferiority among As-
samese-speaking people of the relative excellence of Bengali-speaking 
people, who surpassed them in the economic field and outperformed 
them in civil service and educational examinations.169 It was thought 
that "once Assamese emerged as the official language, the Bengalis, 
of a genuinely new world order .... [Ilt is possible to see moves toward self.determination as 
a net gain for liberty ... and in any case, the day seems to be past when rebellious people can 
be forced to remain in a state they want no part of." George J. Church, Splinter, Splinter, Little 
State, TIME, July 6, 1992, at 36. 
166PALANDE, supra note 20, at 207. 
167 Id. 
168 Addis, supra note 148, at 1270. 
169Suship Kumar, Formation of State Politics, in STATE POLITICS IN INDIA 41 (Iqbal Narain 
ed., 1967) cited in HOROWITZ, supra note 37, at 220. 
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for want of efficiency in it, would automatically be put at bay."170 Such 
linguistic chauvinism should not be allowed to continue today, espe-
cially in the face of growing ethnic tension. It would be not only 
insensitive and impractical to try to impose either the Assamese or 
Bengali language over both linguistic groups as the only "official" 
language, but the extent to which any language can be imposed is 
constitutionally limited.l7l 
Because Bengalis now constitute the largest linguistic group in 
Assam, one way to curtail Bengali animosity against the Assamese 
would be to establish Bengali as an alternative official language in 
Assam. There is a constitutional right in India to the official recogni-
tion of the use of a language.172 A state legislature may, by law, adopt 
anyone or more of the languages in use in the state as the language 
to be used for any or all of the official purposes of that state.173 There 
is also a constitutional provision for the recognition of any other 
language "for the official purposes of a State upon a substantial popu-
lar demand for it being made to the President [ofIndia]."174 What is 
needed for Bengali to achieve official language status, therefore, is for 
the Indian President to be satisfied that a substantial proportion of 
Assam's population desires the use of Bengali to be recognized by the 
state. 175 Certainly, the sheer numbers of Bengalis in Assam would justify 
this counterclaim for linguistic parity.176 
The Indian Constitution also contains a safeguard that empowers 
the President of the Indian Parliament to appoint a special officer 
170Id. 
171 See PALANDE, supra note 20, at 490. 
172 SIGLER, supra note 91, at 142. 
173 INDIA CONST. arts. 347, 348. 
174 DURGA DAS BAsu, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 339 (1976). 
175 INDIA CONST. art. 347. 
176 Instead of promoting Assamese and Bengali to one level of official parity, another option 
would be to choose an official language that only a small minority of the people speak as their 
mother tongue. This solution would give advantages to a small segment of society, but it might 
prove better to elevate the status of a small group rather than continue to enforce the domination 
of a large one. A common language used in the government and taught in the schools would 
foster a deeper sense of common statehood. At the same time, the varied linguistic traditions of 
Assam could be preserved by insisting that all students also learn their parents' tongue as a second 
language. This strategy of nominating a minority language as the official language has worked 
well in Singapore (where only 15% of the population speaks the national language of Malay), 
and the possibility exists that this policy could enjoy equal success in Assam. See Jose Katigbak, 
Singapure's "SPeak Mandarin ijYou are Chinese" Slogan Upsets, REUTERS, Dec. 23, 1990, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. The official language to be chosen could be Hindi or one 
of a number of tribal languages. Whereas the indigenous Assamese speakers might initially reject 
this idea as further eradicating their cultural heritage, they might eventually find it more prefer-
able than Bengali language domination. 
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whose responsibility it is "to investigate all matters relating to the 
safeguards provided for linguistic minorities."177 This enables the cen-
tral government to intervene to prevent linguistic minorities from 
actual or potential language discrimination. 
If these constitutional methods fail to create "official language" 
parity among Assam's competing linguistic groups, then Assam's legis-
lature could consider other ways to grant greater privileges to linguistic 
minorities. For example, the legislature could ensure that all legal 
residents of Assam have the same access to and opportunity for edu-
cation in their native languages.178 This could be achieved by legislation 
specifying that adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue 
of minority groups be available not only at the primary education level, 
but also in the state's secondary schools and universities.179 Bengali-
speaking, Nepalese-speaking, and tribal schools would receive the same 
financial assistance as that now granted to state-sponsored Assamese 
schools, so that all the linguistic groups of Assam receive equal educa-
tional opportunity under the law. Measures such as this are imperative: 
because language helps define cultures, no solution to Assam's cultural 
conflict will be complete unless it includes a linguistic dimension. 
C. Political Suggestions 
Granting minority groups greater rights within the political system 
is another way to ensure that ruling parties in the Assam Legislative 
Assembly and dominant groups in Assamese society do not take advan-
tage of their superior numbers to oppress minority groups actively or 
exclude them passively. A first step would be to reserve seats in the 
Legislative Assembly for representatives of ethnic minorities. Under 
the Indian Constitution, seats are apportioned at the national level to 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,180 which also have reserved 
177INDIA CONST. art. 350B. 
178 Assam could follow the example of Northern Ireland, where both public and private 
parochial schools (but not other private schools) receive almost equal funding from the govern-
ment. See Edgar Graham, Religion and Education-The Constitutional Problem, 33 N. IR. LEGAL 
Q. 20, 31-33 (1982). 
179 See INDIA CONST. art. 350A. There is an international legal basis for such legislation. Under 
the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, to which India is not a party, 
states have agreed that it is important to allow minorities to use and teach their own language. 
UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, opened for signature Dec. 14, 1960, 
429 U.N.T.S. 93 (entered into force May 22, 1962). 
180 INDIA CONST. art. 330. Although the Indian Constitution does not define these groups or 
provide detailed standards by which they may be determined, it does provide an agency and a 
method for designating them. MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACK-
WARD CLASSES IN INDIA 121 (1984). Generally, these "categories are intended to comprise those 
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seats in state governments. 181 In an initiative recently passed by the 
Indian Parliamerit, but still awaiting ratification by several of India's 
states, a quota system ensures the election of women to local village 
councils.182 Devising a similar system of reserved seats or weighted 
representation for subnationalities at the state level in Assam would 
not necessarily ensure equality in all matters, but it would ensure 
minority representation and political participation in affairs of the 
state and provide a framework for the development of full equality. 
D. Economic Suggestions 
Even with political and linguistic reform, ethnic conflict in Assam 
will continue unless there is also an abatement of competition among 
the various groups over economic concerns. One solution to the eco-
nomic rivalry in Assam would be for the central government to ensure 
more fairness to ethnic groups in the area of public employment. A 
principal complaint of the Assam movement is that not enough of the 
bureaucratic administration of Assam is in the hands of native As-
samese.183 In 1988, sixty-two percent of the state administrative person-
nel were native Bengali speakers. 184 Although almost all of these public 
employees were legal residents of Assam, it is a source of constant 
friction that native Assamese speakers are vastly outnumbered in these 
important positions.185 If job reservations were made in public employ-
ment for ethnic groups in proportion to their percentage of Assam's 
total population, then tensions surrounding the employment and 
placement of Assamese civil service personnel might relax. Equal op-
who were at the bottom or the margins of the Indian social order-those groups who because of 
their low ritual status in the traditional Hindu hierarchy or their spatial and cultural isolation 
were subjected to imposition of disabilities and lack of opportunity." Id. at 122. Since Indian 
independence, "backward classes" has retained a multiplicity of meanings, generally used "to 
describe the totality of groups entitled to preferential treatment on the basis of their 'backward-
ness.'" Id. at 185-86; see also SIGLER, supra note 91, at 141. 
181 INDIA CONST. art. 332(1), (2), (3). Originally, these provisions were supposed to cease to 
have effect upon the expiration of a period of 10 years from the commencement of the Indian 
Constitution. They have been extended for successive lO-year periods by the Constitution (Eighth 
Amendment) Act, 1959; the Constitution (Twenty-Third Amendment) Act, 1969; and the Con-
stitution (Forty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 1980. GALANTER, supra note 180, at 572. 
182This quota scheme has already been implemented in several Indian states, including 
Assam. Jeremy Clift, Quotas to Help Indian Women to Grassroots Power, REUTERS, May 28, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. 
183 Id. at 158. 
184 Id. 
185 Assamese personnel in railroad, postal, and nationalized banking services in Assam con· 
stitute only 10% of the total employees. The leadership of the Assamese movement considers this 
continued imbalance to be further evidence of Bengali "encroachment." See id. 
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portunity in public employment is guaranteed to all citizens of India, 
however, and any kind of quota system would be met with strong 
opposition.186 Affirmative action in public employment in India, how-
ever, is not without precedent: provisions have been permitted in the 
Indian Constitution for the reservation of appointments or posts at 
the state and national level in favor of Scheduled Castes and tribal 
groupS.187 Although a plan at the national level to expand such reser-
vations to "other backward classes" failed two years ago, similar at-
tempts at the state level have succeeded.188 It follows that reserving 
government positions for ethnic minorities at the state or local level 
might also succeed. A more practical solution to advance the economic 
interests of Assam's competing ethnic groups would be for the national 
or state governments to sponsor programs that allocate certain 
amounts of money to businesses owned by the various groups.189 Guar-
anteeing such rights to the Assamese (or any minority group) would 
ensure their active representation and participation in the administra-
tion of the state, and grant them greater economic opportunity. 
This raises the question, however, of whether it is appropriate to 
set aside employment for a particular ethnic group merely because it 
speaks a different language or practices a different religion. The First 
Amendment to the Indian Constitution, inserted as Article 15 (4), 
established the legal right of affirmative action in India by providing 
states the right to make reservations in educational institutions and 
government posts for certain segments of society.190 The amendment 
states that "nothing shall prevent the State from making any special 
provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally back-
ward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes."19l Article 46, reflecting the same spirit, reiterates that "the State 
shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests 
of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, the Scheduled 
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social 
186Under the Indian Constitution, no person may be discriminated against in the matter of 
public employment on the grounds of race, religion, or caste. INDIA CoNST. art. 16(2). 
187INDIA CONST. art. 16(4). 
188Reservations in state legislatures for "other backward classes" have had their greatest 
successes in Kerala and Bihar, where affirmative action policies have been utilized to galvanize 
support for political parties. For more on the constitutional treatment of the backward classes of 
India, see SIGLER, supra note 91, at 143-45. 
189 John B. Attanasio, Foreword to Symposium, The Rights of Ethnic Minarities, 66 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. 1205 (1991). For example, the Assam legislature could require private firms to use 
minority-owned businesses. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
190INDIA CaNST. art. 15(4). 
191Id. 
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irUustice and all forms of exploitation. "192 Although these two provi-
sions present a rubric under which Parliament might make special 
provisions for ethnic minorities in Assam, it would be very difficult (in 
a legal and moral sense) to equate the Assamese people themselves 
with "the weaker sections of the people" or "the socially and education-
ally backward classes of citizens." The Assamese claim that they have 
been oppressed economically, and that the future of their culture and 
language is at stake in Assam. 193 Nevertheless, it is wrong to view the 
Assamese in the same light as India's backward classes. If the Assamese 
people hope to achieve greater rights, their chances would be better 
if they worked not just for their individual ethnic community alone, 
but for greater rights for all the citizens of Assam. 
E. National QJ1,estion 
The ease with which political issues in India can splinter into 
regional, linguistic, and communal conflicts has led the central gov-
ernment to impress a secular nationalist ideology upon the Indian 
people.194 During the 1950s, Prime Minister Nehru stressed repeatedly 
that in a country of hundreds of subnationalities, the most important 
factor was the unity of India. Nehru regarded political expressions of 
ethnicity as "reflections of parochial sentiments unworthy of a mod-
ernizing nation seeking to realize developmental objectives."195 Al-
though ethnic groups have claimed success in India at various levels, 196 
the underlying imperative to forge a national unity has forced the 
government of India to maintain a strong central authority over the 
numerous Indian states.197 The federal arrangement is particularly well 
suited for this purpose, because it effects a reconciliation between local 
patriotism and the need for an indivisible union of local entities in the 
interest of defense, development, and the growth of a common cul-
ture. 198 The structure of the Indian Constitution offers the constituent 
Indian states the necessary freedom to develop in their own way and 
to govern themselves, yet it still provides a central government to guard 
and advance the interests of all. 199 
192JNDIA CONST. art. 46. 
193 See JOSHI, supra note 5, at 50-51. 
194 See PALANDE, supra note 20, at 160-62. 
195 Ethnicity, Democracy, and Development, supra note 99, at 148. 
196 Most importantly, state boundaries were redefined along linguistic lines. Erosion of sup-
port for the Congress Party during the 1950s gradually led India's national leaders to concede 
the demand for linguistic states. See AKBAR, supra note 126, at 81. 
197 PALANDE, supra note 20, at 214. 
198Id. 
199 The different responsibilities of the Indian Union and the states are clearly demarcated 
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Nevertheless, it is overcentralization and the sense of not belong-
ing to Delhi's power structure that makes certain Assamese join ex-
tremist groups like the United Liberation Front of Assam.20o The cen-
tral government has been taking away many "state powers," and as a 
result, even a small demand for genuine rights takes the form of 
separatism and secession.201 So far, the central government has been 
unable to cope with the rise in intensity of India's various ethnic 
movements and their increased demands for greater autonomy and 
self-determination.202 Arguably, the solution is more federalism and 
greater decentralization. The central government should be urged to 
relax its rigid financial and administrative grip over India's twenty-five 
states and seven Union Territories. The problem, of course, is that the 
rise of violent separatist movements has strengthened argumen ts for a 
stronger and more powerful national government and against devolu-
tion of powers to the states. 
Because Assam was never part of the Mughal empire, did not come 
under British control until 1826, and is in a remote corner of India, 
the region has always maintained a certain independence from central 
government control. This independence has been interpreted occa-
sionally by the central government as disloyalty toward the Indian 
Union.203 Surrounded by Burma, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and China, As-
sam occupies a strategic position on the subcontinent. Accordingly, it 
is important for the Indian government to preserve the Assamese 
peoples' identity as Indian citizens. This policy continues to present a 
great paradox for the Indian government. If the central government 
in the Indian Constitution. See PALANDE, supra note 20, at 221-29. Some of the responsibilities 
of the Indian Union include admission into, and emigration from, India; citizenship; naturaliza-
tion; and aliens. Id. The more important State responsibilities include the administration of 
justice (except for the High and Supreme Courts); education; religious/social associations; local 
government; and public order. Id. When intergovernmental disputes arise, the Indian Union 
authority typically controls. R. HARGRAVE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN A DEVELOPING 
NATION 87-88 (3d ed. 1980). 
200 Kate Webb, SlJViet Breakup Sparks Debate Over Split-Up of India, Agence France Pre sse, Dec. 
30,1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File. 
201 Raju Gopalakrishnan, Multi-Ethnic, Multi-Religious India Questions Future Unity, 
REUTERS, Jan. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. 
202 In addition to the conflict in Assam, the central government faces separatist movements 
in Punjab, Tamil Nadu, and Jammu and Kashmir. It should be noted, however, that modern 
political practice does not consider purely ethnic rights of national groups to be an exhaustive 
foundation for self-determination to the extent of claiming the right to create an independent 
state. See Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), 1975 I.C]. 12, in The International Recognition of 
National Rights: The Baltic States' Case, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1392 (1991). 
203DAS, supra note 4, at 190. In BETWEEN THE LINES, Kuldip Nayan quotes the full text of a 
letter addressed to Prime Minister Nehru by the Home Minister Vallabhai Patel, in which Mr. 
Patel mentions the doubtful allegiance of the people of the northeastern region and suggests 
measures to "Indianize" them. Id. 
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grants special rights and privileges to the Assamese people, it will 
enhance their traditional isolation and increase their desire for greater 
autonomy from the rest of India. On the other hand, if the central 
government denies the Assamese any rights for the protection of their 
language and culture, thereby allowing the Bengali language and cul-
ture to eventually assume dominance, then the Assamese will be alien-
ated further and will resist even more their incorporation within the 
Indian Union.204 One strategy that nations have used in the past to 
destroy the ethnic separation of subnationalities is to encourage mi-
gration to the sub nationality region.205 The objective is to swamp the 
"locals" with large numbers of immigrants-usually ethnic groups loyal 
to the government-for the purposes of diluting the local culture and 
forcing the acculturation of the people of that area.206 It is unlikely that 
this is the Indian government's purpose in allowing the "Bangladeshi-
zation" of Assam, but as long as illegal immigration continues and as 
long as the various groups of Assam are not given the rights and 
privileges necessary to ensure the preservation of their languages and 
cultures, Assam will remain weak and fragmented. Whereas a strong 
Assam might harbor dreams of secession, a weak Assam can only 
remain loyal to the Indian Union. It is for this reason that the Assamese 
people fear that the central government will never make a concerted 
effort to resolve Assam's ethnic conflict.207 
India will gain its minorities' loyalty according to its courage to 
grant minority rights, and it must be aware that such an attitude may 
204India cannot let Assam secede for fear that it would be followed by an independent 
Kashmir, Khalistan, Tamil Nadu, Nagaland, Tripura, a greater Bengal united with Bangladesh, 
and so on. Raju G.C. Thomas, Why India Resists Kashmiri Separatism, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, 
July 22, 1991, at 19. An arrangement based on "territorial autonomy" for Assam is similarly 
unsuitable. Although such autonomy-created through legislation or by a constitutional amend-
ment-applies when minority guarantees are seen as the answers to nationality problems, as 
functions of self-determination, it does not apply where the territory comprises scattered immi-
grants seeking assimilation or when territorial self-government simply meets the demand for local 
administration. See ISTVAN BIBO, THE PARALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE 
REMEDIES: A STUDY OF SELF-DETERMINATION, CONCORD AMONG THE MAJOR POWERS, AND Po-
LITICAL ARBITRATION 97 (1976). 
205 See DAS, supra note 4, at 190. 
206This is taking place in Tibet, for example, where the Chinese government continues to 
encourage the settlement of millions of Han Chinese within the Tibetan society. Guy Dinore, 
Dalai Lama Accuses China of Overrunning Tibet, REUTERS, Aug. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, Reuter File. 
2fYl At the diplomatic level, the central government has requested Bangladesh to take suitable 
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be rewarded as much by stabilization and a strengthening of the mi-
norities' civil loyalty as by increased separatism. India must be aware 
that the more these rights are denied, the stronger the possibility that 
a minority movement will become a separatist one. 208 The Indian cen-
tral government therefore must walk a fine line to preserve ethnic 
diversity and, at the same time, ensure national unity. In deciding on 
an appropriate path, the Indian government must remember that 
movements for the preservation of ethnic identity are not always seces-
sionist. Quite often such movements may help in restructuring na-
tional identity and, instead of disintegrating, may actually reintegrate 
national sovereignty in such a manner that ethnic identities become 
stronger without weakening the "center" or jeopardizing its overall 
authority. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although some elements within the Assam movement have con-
tinued to alienate the tribal groups remaining in Assam by propound-
ing ultra-Assamese nationalism, a much larger section has attempted 
to understand tribal cultures and aspirations, and to integrate them 
with their own.209 As a result, the Assam movement has received sup-
port from the tribal population in many districts.210 Indeed, it is a 
positive sign that there is a growing awareness among the Assamese 
intelligentsia today regarding the aspirations of the tribal population 
of the state, and it is reassuring that efforts are being made to institute 
and implement measures designed to preserve and develop tribal 
language and culture.211 Although it is true that the tribal groups in 
Assam do not pose the same threat to the Assamese that the immigrant 
Bengalis do, the acceptance by the Assamese of tribal culture within 
Assam indicates that there may be room for the Assamese and Bengalis 
to coexist without conflict as well. This will not be possible, however, 
until a new legal framework exists in Assam to protect and preserve 
the different ethnic minority cultures, so that no group fears cultural 
domination by another. 
The Assamese want nothing more than the right to preserve their 
identity in their home state within the framework of the Indian Con-
stitution. Attempts to deny them their place within the Indian Union, 
however, will only accelerate the process of alienation. This necessitates 
208 See BIBO, supra note 204, at 98. 
209 MISRA, supra note 8, at 59. 
210Id. 
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the search for a solution that, while fulfilling the legitimate aspirations 
of the Assamese people, will not involve the wholesale deportation of 
illegal residents. Assam's problems will not go away by determining 
which immigrants are actually "foreigners" and then expelling them. 
There are distinct divisions among the various ethnic-linguistic groups 
in Assam that must be addressed regardless of the issue of illegal 
immigration. It would be wrong to classify the Assam movement purely 
as one directed against outsiders when the major motivating force is 
Assamese chauvinism. The conflict must therefore be seen within the 
broader question of Assamese and Bengali subnationalisms. The ethnic 
conflict in Assam will be solved only when no group feels that its 
language is threatened or the future of it'i culture is at risk. This can 
be achieved only if greater rights and privileges are granted to all of 
Assam's minorities to ensure the protection and preservation of their 
ethnic identities. 
